receive damages for the unauthorized commercial use of his name or likeness. 5 But a famous person may prefer popularity with a price tag to protection from publicity. And, paradoxically, the threat of an action grounded upon the right of privacy may compel payment from advertisers for use of a name or picture. However, since the right of privacy was designed primarily to protect an individual's interest in being let alone, 0 it is held to be personal I and non-assignable. 8 An advertising licensee is, therefore, unable to invoke the right of privacy to prevent use of the famous person's name or likeness by third parties. 9 But the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Frank, recently held that an individual has, independent of the right of privacy, rights in his name or picture which can be granted to an exclusive licensee. 10 by the subject, however, an individual ordinarily could not complain of unauthorized use of his name or picture in the absence of defamation, Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F,2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936 6. The "right to be let alone" was the phrase used by Warren and Brandeis in their pioneer article on the right of privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rxv. 193, 205 (1890) . Subsequent commentators have suggested that this phrase is too narrow to describe the totality of diverse interests protected by the right, contending that the right should be analyzed il terms of such personality interests as name, picture, life history, feeling, and emotions. Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. Ray. 237 (1932) . The phrase "interest in being let alone" is used here for lack of a better phrase to describe the totality of ways in which an individual may wish to protect himself from the public gaze, as opposed to a person's "commercial interest" in being paid for publicity. cf. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bardsky Co., 78 F.2d 763, (5th Cir. 1936) . See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953) .
9. See cases cited in note 8 supra. 10. Although the Second Circuit spoke only of photographs, the court probably intended the decision to apply to names as well. The reasons given by the court for recognizing the right, note 13 infra, justify protection of names as well as photographs. Further, the cases which the court cites in support of the right of publicity, note 14 infra, involved persons' names rather than pictures.
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In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chc'wing Gum Co." 1 a bubble gum manufacturer who had obtained contracts with big-league baseball players for the exclusive right to use their names and likenesses in connection with the sale of gum or candy sought to enjoin defendant who subsequently used these advertising devices in the promotion of its candy.
12 Defendant had argued that the ball players possessed no legal interest in their photographs other than the right of privacy, which could not be assigned to plaintiff. But the court stated that, in addition to his privacy right, a man has a "right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture." 1 3 11. 202 F2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) . 12. Plaintiff had alleged in the district court that defendant had infringed plaintiff's common-law trade mark "Baseball" by using it on candy wrappers; that defendant was engaging in unfair competition by "passing off" its candy as that of plaintiff's; and that defendant had invaded rights given plaintiff by his exclusive contract with the layers. The district court denied relief on all counts: it held that the name "baseball" %.as generic, and could not be appropriated as a trade mark; that there w.-as ni proof of consumers being deceived by the similarity in advertising; and that plaintiff's contracts with the players gave it no rights against third parties, on the theory that a personal name cannot be "assigned in gross." Bowman Gum v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 103 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) . On appeal, the plaintiffs dropped their charges of trade mark infringement and unfair competition. Co., 202 F2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) . Judge Swan concurred only in so much of the opinion as dealt with defendant's liability for inducing breach of contract.
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum
Hae/an is the first case e-xpressly to recognize a "right of publicity." The Second Circuit cited as authority Liebigs Extract of 'Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 18u Fed. 688 (2d Cir. 1910) , which held that the exclusive licensee of the name "Liebig" could prevent its use on competing products. But it is not clear whether the result is based "n the exclusive contract, or on trade name infringement dvctrine. Another case vhich lays the foundation for the decision is Uproar Co. v. National Droadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934 ), aff'd, 81 F2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denicd, 298 U.S. o70 (1936 , where the court held a radio station had a "property right" in the name of a radio announcer with whom it had an exclusive contract. But that case can be distinguished from Haelan on the grounds that there the court placed great weight on the fact that the station had, through expenditure of time and money, created "good will" in the name, which a third party had appropriated. Two cases seem opposed to the right of publicity: Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F2d 763 (5th Cir. 1936); and Pehas Co. v. Leslie, 52 N.Y.L.J. 1864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1915) . The Second Circuit chose not to follow the Hanna case, and distinguished Pekas on the grounds that there the court's attention was drawn exclusively to the right of privacy, which it held non-assignablei and did not consider other rights which a person may have in his name or picture.
The Court gave no reason for recognizing the right of publicity other than that famous people would often receive no money for the use of their names and pictures unless they could grant a licensee protection against third parties. The cases which the Court cites in support of the right, Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 22 N.Y. 83, 118 N.E. 214 (1917); and Madison Square Garden v. Universal Pictures, 255 App. Div. 459, 4G5, 7 N.Y.S2d 845, 851 (1st Dept. 1938) , indicate that the Court felt it was folloving a legal "principle" of granting legal protection as "property" to "rights" which have acquired "pecuniary value." In the Madison Square Garden case the Court gave protection on This new right of publicity allows a licensee of a famous person adequate protection against third parties. Traditionally, direct action by the licensee against such parties was permitted where they had induced breach of the contract.
14 And, in addition, use of a name or picture could be enjoined where continued use constituted trademark infringement. 1 " Otherwise the licensee's such a theory to the owner of the Garden against defendant who falsely represented that movies were taken in the Garden Arena. And in Duff-Gordon, the court, in upholding a contract for the exclusive use of a person's name for advertising purposes, implied that such use had commercial value. Apparently the Second Circuit felt that Madison Square Garden plus Duff-Gordon equals the right of publicity.
The view that the law protects people against appropriation of values which they have created received impetus in the case of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), which gave plaintiff relief against defendant who copied news from plaintiff's bulletins and sold it to the public. While Haelan; appears to approve of an extension of this doctrine, the Second Circuit previously held that the News Service case should be limited to the case of news. 814-17 (1935) .
In the principal case, the court indicated that the "right of publicity" may not have all the usual attributes of a "property right ;" for it reserved the question whether and how far defendant would have been liable if he had no knowledge of plaintiff's contract.
14. Active inducement must be proved; mere proof that defendant entered into a contract the performance of which required a breach of plaintiff's contract is usually not enough. (1953) .
In the Haelan case, defendant had contracted with some of the players through its own agent. Here the court held that defendant would be liable for any breach of plaintiff's contracts thus induced. But defendant had also purchased from an independent party contract rights to use other of the players' names and pictures. Further, plaintiff alleged that defendant had used certain players' photographs and names without their consent. Here the rationale of inducement to breach was not available, but the court held that the right of publicity was applicable. Haelan's right of publicity probably gives a famous person more than the right to assign a protectible interest in his name or picture. By allowing an individual to make a grant of the publicity value of his name or photograph, the Haelan case gave protection to persons' commercial interest in their personality independent of their privacy interest. In so doing, Haclan implied that such commercial interest, aside from any privac)y interest, might justify legal protection of an individual against unauthorized use of his name or picture. While a famous person can generally invoke the right of privacy against an advertiser who appropriates his name or picture without permission, ' this right may not always afford adequate protection to his commercial interest in his personality. Celebrities complaining of the unauthorized use of their names or likenesses have sometimes been held, in effect, to have waived their right of privacy because they sought and received publicity in the past.
21
And where relief has been granted under the privacy doctrine it is not clear whether plaintiffs have recovered damages for injury to the commercial intere't in their popularity. ] or picture is to be shielded without reference to the right of privacy, these celebrities will be fully protected: prior publicity will enhance rather than bar relief. They will be able to obtain an injunction or recover damages commensurate with the advertising value of their names or pictures. 2 3 And the right of publicity may be extended beyond advertising cases. A famous person may wish to prevent appropriation of the public appeal of his personality by a telecast reproduction of his performance, 24 a biography, 25 or by use of his photograph for illustrating newspapers or magazines. 20 Here, as in the advertising situation, the right of privacy has sometimes been considered waived because of plaintiff's past exposure in the public limelight, 21 but thi would not be a ground for denying relief under the right of publicity. And, where courts have sometimes held that plaintiff's privacy interest was outhelped her, awarded six cents damages for unauthorized use of name and picture In advertising). Cf. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944) (where plaintiff's character used in fictional novel, privacy complaint sustained, but claim to share In profits dismissed). But cf. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 560, aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) § § 15, 192 (1952) .
24. E.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) Misc. 570, 124 N.Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1910 ). 26. E.g., Larhiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937 Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dep't 1950) .
27. "[Plaintiff's] grievance here is not the invasion of his 'privacy'-privacy is the one thing he did not want or need in his occupation [as animal trainer] . His real complaint, but one we cannot redress in this suit . . . is that he was not paid for the telecasting of his show." Desmond, J., concurring in Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952 Haelan, however, does not decide whether the right of publicity protects only the commercial value of fame. If so limited, the right may affurd incomplete relief in non-advertising cases. For a person's performance, life history, or photograph may have commercial value not only because of his fame, but also because of its inherent educational or entertainment value. But it is not likely that the Second Circuit intended to shield the value of fame alone; if this were the limit of Haeldan's thrust, an unknown artist could not invoke the right of publicity to protect his commercially valuable attributes. The "publicity value of his photograph ' 30 probably refers not merely to the advertising force of fame, but rather to the total potential advertising value of his name or likeness. Similarly, an unknown person's life story or performance may have "publicity value" in aiding the promotion of the book, magazine, or radio or television program in which it appears.
Even though courts may read the right of publicity as merely allowing a person to grant a protectible interest in his name or picture, the Second Circuit's granting of protection to a commercial interest in one's personality sepa-rate from a privacy interest is doctrinally important. In applying the right of privacy, courts have confused commercial interests with privacy interests. The result of making one doctrine do the work of two has been inadequate protection for both these interests in personality. The right of privacy gives inadequate protection to the commercial interest in one's personality because courts have placed upon the right limitations which are appropriate only to the privacy interest. 31 Similarly, in some states the right of privacy gives inadequate protection even to the privacy interest because courts and legislatures have implied that commercial benefit to the defendant is an element of the cause of action. 32 If courts wish to protect both interests to at least some extent, they should do so under separate doctrines, so that limitations appropriate to each interest may be imposed. The Haelan case takes a long step in this direction.
